Colonel Sergey Musienko: We have adapted our artillery tactics in the ongoing war.

Deputy Commander of the Missile Forces and Artillery of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Sergey Musienko, shared insights in an interview with RBK-Ukraine about how artillery tactics have evolved in the war, the current situation with ammunition and artillery systems in the Ukrainian forces, how the Russians are adjusting their approaches, and what allows them to push forward on the front lines.

Colonel Sergey Musienko is a Hero of Ukraine and the Deputy Commander of the Missile Forces and Artillery of the Armed Forces of Ukraine under the Command of the Ground Forces. Musienko began the large-scale war in Kharkiv, where he was leading the Missile Forces and Artillery (RVA) of the "Sloboda" grouping at the time of the invasion, and later became the head of the RVA of the operational-tactical grouping "Kharkiv".

Throughout the war, Colonel Musienko has participated in all significant operations of the Defense Forces: the Izyum operation, which led to the liberation of parts of Kharkiv and Donetsk regions, the liberation of Kherson and the Kherson region, the counteroffensive in the South in 2023, the battles in Donbas, as well as the Kursk operation.

During the conversation, Musienko explains that the main task of artillery is to protect our infantry and prevent the enemy from approaching them. Relying on infantry combat is already a last resort that must not be allowed, says the colonel. However, Russia focuses on infantry assaults during combat operations, disregarding any losses: they attempt to push forward with 1-2 enemy soldiers, accumulating further before transitioning to an assault. Unfortunately, this tactic, supported by guided aerial bombs and missile strikes, allows the occupiers to make headway.

– Does artillery remain the dominant force in the current war?

– At present, artillery remains the primary means of destruction on the battlefield. This includes missile systems, multiple launch rocket systems, artillery guns, and mortars, which inflict damage both at the front line of defense and at considerable distances. Simultaneously, the role of drone firepower is increasing on the front lines, and the scope of their application is expanding overall.

However, it is important to note that fire damage is complex in nature, and currently, missile forces and artillery remain the priority means, which I believe will continue to be a fundamental component of inflicting fire damage on the enemy for a long time to come.

– How has the role of missile forces and artillery changed during recent military conflicts around the world?

– If we start from World War II, in the wars and active combat actions of the second half of the 20th century, the share of enemy destruction by artillery fire, and later by missile forces, reached 70%. In recent conflicts, however, the share of defeats inflicted by missile forces and artillery has sometimes reached nearly 90%.

The trend in the development of missile forces and artillery is gaining momentum. New types of missiles are emerging, and new launchers and warheads are being modernized and created. The same applies to artillery – both barrel and rocket artillery, as well as mortars – modern technologies will never completely displace them. And in terms of fire damage, drones will never replace artillery, as we observe today on the battlefield.

Artillery is, above all, an all-weather means of conducting combat operations. It is a relatively low-cost asset, allowing soldiers to learn their responsibilities quickly, from mortars to missile systems.

If you recall, our new branch of the military – the Forces of Unmanned Systems of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – was established within a separate command body and began its development under the Main Directorate of Missile Forces, Artillery, and Unmanned Systems of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. What united us primarily was aerial reconnaissance and destruction.

However, we have seen rapid advancements in unmanned systems; UAVs have started to be used not only for reconnaissance and destruction but their range of tasks has significantly expanded. At certain times, we, as artillerymen, had to focus more on unmanned systems (drones), mastering and developing them, putting artillery on the back burner. The separation of unmanned systems and the creation of a distinct branch was a very wise decision.

– What is the role of unmanned aerial vehicles in correcting artillery fire?

– It is very significant. Almost all precision strikes by missile forces – including those using missiles from systems like HIMARS, MLRS, and similar – are conducted with target observation. Long-range fixed-wing UAVs are used to confirm the presence of targets and the results of destruction.

In correcting artillery fire, the role of UAVs is crucial because ground observation posts have very limited capabilities for adjusters and a high probability that they themselves will come under enemy fire. The ability to conduct aerial observation of a target significantly enhances both the depth of reconnaissance and the accuracy of determining target coordinates and the locations of shell impacts.

Initially, UAVs began appearing in artillery reconnaissance units for reconnaissance and correction. These included fixed-wing UAVs such as "Furia," "Aist," and so-called "drones" – multi-rotor UAVs like "Mavic-2," "Autel," and others. After 2014, we began to use UAVs separately for aerial reconnaissance and correction. Since then, we have gradually aimed to fulfill fire missions without preliminary adjustments and corrections – using UAVs or technical reconnaissance means. This allows us to carry out artillery fire missions with sufficient effectiveness and lower ammunition expenditure.

– What is our current situation with different types of ammunition? Have "NATO" calibers already replaced Soviet ones?

– We often say: there can never be too many ammunition. The calculated need for artillery ammunition that the Armed Forces have is based on our situation at the front and the planned tasks. This is a significant quantity – it is more than we have ever been provided. Let’s say we receive half as much artillery ammunition due to various factors. Consequently, we observe the current situation in certain sectors of the front under conditions of a shortage of specific types of artillery ammunition.

Regarding calibers, the Soviet caliber of 152 mm is being replaced. However, first of all, there are still production facilities in the world for these munitions. There are also sufficiently modern artillery systems currently in operation in our troops of this caliber, and there is a supply of 152 mm rounds. These include Czech self-propelled howitzers DANA-M2 and the "Msta-B" Soviet howitzer.

We began this large war with Russia using 152 mm and 122 mm guns. However, starting from mid-2022, we began to receive 155 mm and 105 mm howitzers provided by our partners. For example, we first began using 155 mm M777A2 howitzers in the Izyum direction (this was the 67th separate artillery division of the 406th separate artillery brigade). Subsequently, during the counteroffensive in the Kharkiv direction, there were several units armed with 155 mm guns.

In terms of ratios, the Defense Forces used approximately 1.5 million artillery shells in 2022 – ranging from 120 mm mines to rocket projectiles for MLRS. Half of these were of 152 mm and 122 mm calibers. A third were 155 mm rounds. By 2023, we have expended over 3 million shells, of which 1.6-1.7 million were 155 mm munitions. This means that half of the ammunition we used was 155 mm.

– And what is the ratio for this year?

– Currently, the ratio of 152 mm to 155 mm is 1 to 10, respectively. At the same time, with "NATO" caliber, there are also 105 mm guns, which have also proven themselves very well. In the future, the 155 mm caliber will replace the 152 mm guns, but we cannot do this quickly.

– If I understood correctly, the caliber that we use the most is 155?

– Yes. Then comes 122 mm, followed by 105 mm, and much further back is 152 mm.

– Regarding the gap in artillery fire between us and the Russians. The last public figure I heard was given by the first deputy defense minister Ivan Havryliuk in an interview a month ago – 1 to 2. Has this changed as of now?

– 1:2 is the baseline figure. During certain periods of operations, this gap has reached nearly 1:6 – 1:7 in favor of the enemy. If we used conditionally 300-350 thousand, the Russians used up to 2 million per month. This includes all calibers across all sectors of the front. This was especially noticeable in 2023 during the Bakhmut operation of the enemy.

– Our supply of shells is less than that of the Russians. Am I correct in understanding that considering we have many Western systems that are more modern, while the enemy’s army is